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Abstract of Thesis
ANALYSIS OF THE EURO AND THE EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM AND ITS EFFECT ON GREECE
IN THE LIGHT OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL CRISIS

The ability to issue money used for transactions is a power usually reserved by a country’s
central government, and it is often seen as a part of a nation’s sovereignty. A monetary union
entails multiple countries ceding control over the supply of money to a common authority. The
euro was introduced sixteen years ago and has since functioned well, with the European Central
Bank keeping inflation low. However, the current Eurozone crisis provides a severe test of the
euro’s ability to survive. The Eurozone crisis is plagued by fiscal crises, which have taken their
biggest toll on Greece. A competitiveness crises, which is evident in the large current account
deficits along the Eurozone’s periphery, and the even larger current account imbalances
between Eurozone countries, and a banking crisis, which first unfolded in Ireland, has now
spread in the euro area. This thesis asks one main question: will the euro survive the Eurozone
crisis?
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Chapter 1: Introduction
When economist Robert Mundell theorized about a monetary union, also known as
currency union or common currency area, in the twentieth century, most people did not pay
much attention; however, recently many European countries established a monetary union with
a common currency called the euro. A monetary union is in many ways similar to a fixedexchange-rate regime, whereby countries retain distinct national currencies but agree to adjust
the relative supply of these to maintain a desired rate of exchange. A monetary union is an
extreme form of a fixed-exchange-rate regime, with at least two distinctions. The first is
distinguished by countries switching to a new currency, the cost of abandoning the new system
is much higher than for a typical fixed-exchange-rate regime, giving people more confidence
that the system will last.
Secondly, a monetary union eliminates the transaction costs people incur when they
need to exchange currencies in carrying out international transactions. Fixed-exchange-rate
regimes have been quite common. For instance, most advanced countries participated in the
Bretton Woods System, a regime from the 1940s until 1973; numerous European nations had
one too until the creation of the monetary union; and many small or poor countries like Bhutan,
and Botswana for example, continue to peg their exchange rates to the currencies of major
trading partners.1
Before the current European Monetary Union, monetary unions were not that common
in the world. From 1865 until World War I, all four members of the Latin Monetary Union—
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Barry Eichengreen, “European Monetary Unification,” Journal of Economic Literature (1993): 1321-57,
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France, Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland—allowed coins to circulate throughout the union.
Luxembourg shared a currency with its larger neighbor Belgium from 1992 until the formation of
the broader European Monetary Union in 1972. In addition, many former colonies such as the
Franc zone in western African countries like (Benin and Burkina-Faso), and small poor countries
(Ecuador and Panama) adopted the currency of a large, wealthier trading partner. The formation
of the European Monetary Union by a group of large and wealthy countries is an unprecedented
experiment in international monetary arrangements.
The creation of the European Monetary Union had political and economic motives. The
economic motive was based on Mundell’s Optimum Currency Area Theory, while politically the
Europeans wanted to integrate Europe. However, once the European Monetary Union was
created critics mentioned that the euro would not be able to survive.
In this thesis we begin with a discussion on the theory behind the creation of a
monetary union and the benefits of having a common currency. In chapter three we give a brief
history of the European monetary system, then in chapter four we analyze the euro and the
European financial crisis, with a special emphasis on the case of Greece. We also try to answer
the following important questions: Will the euro survive the Eurozone Crisis? Was Greece ready
to join the union when it did? If the Maastricht treaty was supposed to stabilize the member
countries, why didn’t it help Greece? What policies must be put forward in order to restore
stability and help Greece?

3

Chapter 2: Is the Eurozone an Optimum Currency Area?
Introduction
In this chapter the developments of the European Monetary Union will be discussed and
the chapter will be concluded by evaluating whether or not the European Monetary Union
meets the requirements of being an OCA. Mundell published his article in 1961, “A Theory of
Optimum Currency Areas” and he asks a very important question: under what circumstances
would it be acceptable for various regions of the world to adopt a common currency?2 To
answer this, Mundell gave an example of North America. This question is interesting because
Mundell talked about a new global monetary map based on a regional, rather than a national
viewpoint. Hence, a region like Germany could join with a region like France to create their own
currency and abandon the mark and the franc.
In what circumstances could it be of benefit for Western Canada and the Western
United States to join together to create a Western currency, or for the Eastern parts of the two
countries to create a currency peculiar to the East of the continent? The relationship between
these two new currencies, which would replace the Canadian dollar and the United States
dollar, would be governed by a floating exchange rate.3
To answer this question, Mundell developed a cost-benefit analysis of the monetary
union. The benefits of adopting a common currency include:

2

Robert Mundell, “A Theory of Optimal Currency Areas,” The American Economic Review, no. 4 (1961):
657-65, accessed July 8, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1812792?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
3
Ibid., p. 659
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1. A reduction of the transaction costs generated by the existence of various currencies
and a gain in the liquidity of the currency, attributable mainly to the expansion of its area of
transactions, from which all financial markets would also benefit.4
2. A single currency should end currency instability in the participating countries (by
irrevocably fixing exchange rates) and reduce it outside of them. Because the euro would have
the enhanced credibility of being used in a large currency zone, it would be more stable against
speculation than individual currencies are now. An end to internal currency instability and a
reduction of external currency instability would enable exporters to project future markets with
greater certainty, and this will unleash a greater potential for growth.5
3. Consumers would not have to change money when travelling and would encounter
less red tape when transferring large sums of money across borders. It was estimated by the
European commission that a traveler visiting all twelve member states of the former EC would
lose 40% of the value of his money in transaction charges alone. If a family made a large
purchase or transaction across a European border, such as buying a holiday home or a piece of
furniture, a single currency would help that transaction pass smoothly.6
4. Businesses would no longer have to pay hedging costs, in order to insure themselves
against the threat of currency fluctuations. Businesses, involved in commercial transactions in
different member states, would no longer have to face administrative costs of accounting for
the changes of currencies, plus the time involved. It is estimated that the currency cost of
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Special Report,” BBC news, November 21 1997, accessed April 11, 2015,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/special_report/single_currency/25081.stm.
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exports to small companies is 10 times the cost to the multi-nationals, who offset sales against
purchases and can command the best rates.7
5. A single currency should result in lower interest rates as all European countries would
be locking into German monetary credibility. The stability pact would force EU countries into a
system of fiscal responsibility which will enhance the euro’s international credibility. This should
lead to more investment, more jobs and lower mortgage rates.8
The disadvantages associated with having a common currency would come from the
elimination of the exchange rate between participants in the union:
1. It would no longer be possible to let the exchange rate absorb shocks asymmetrically
affecting the various regions of a monetary union.9
To understand how the asymmetrical shock works and the role of the exchange rate,
Mundell gives an example of Western Canada producing forestry products, and the East
automobiles.10 He imagines a change in consumer tastes that pushes up the demand for
automobiles and compresses that for forestry products. This shock is asymmetrical to the extent
that it creates a surplus demand for products from the East and a surplus supply of products
from the West. The price of automobiles will tend to increase, leading to a general rise in prices
in the East; conversely, prices will tend to decline in the West, as a result of a fall in the price of
forestry products. The terms of trade between the West and the East deteriorates. In this
example, if the two regions use the same currency, the Canadian dollar, the Canadian central

7
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bank will be faced with a dilemma: should it combat the unemployment arising in the West or
the inflation threatening the East? This dilemma can be resolved through mobility of the factors
of production, and the labor factor in particular. If capital and labor shift from the industries that
have suffered from a decline in demand toward those enjoying surplus demand, from the West
toward the East in our example, balance can be restored in the stability of prices and
employment.11
Where there is no mobility in the factors of production, asymmetrical shocks could be
absorbed by a change in the exchange rate, but for that to occur, the affected regions must each
have their own currency. In the previous example, if there were a central bank in the West, it
could lower its interest rates to combat unemployment, while the central bank in the East could
raise its interest rates to combat inflation. The Western currency would depreciate against that
of the East, and balance would be restored at a lower adjustment cost than if the two regions
had a common currency.
2. Unlike the U.S., where the labor market is mobile and there is a common language,
the Eurozone includes fifteen separate countries with widely different economic performances
and different languages. Without true integration among the member-states it can lead to
depressed areas in which people cannot find work and areas where the economy flourishes.
3. If governments were obliged through a stability pact, to keep the Maastricht criteria
no matter what their economic circumstances dictate, some countries may find that they are
unable to deal with recession by losing their fiscal stance. For instance, they would be unable to

11

Ibid., 665

7
devalue to boost exports, to spend more to boost job creation, or cut taxes when they see fit
because of the public deficit criterion.
4. Loss of national sovereignty is another big disadvantage. The transfer of money and
fiscal competencies from national to European levels would mean economically strong and
stable countries would have to cooperate in the field of economic policy with other weaker
countries which are more tolerant to higher inflation.12
In the next section of this chapter we discuss the developments of the European
Monetary Union and we conclude the chapter by evaluating whether or not the European
Monetary Union meets the requirements of being an OCA.

The Creation of the Monetary Union, The European Case.
Considering the fact that no pan-European currency has been in circulation since the fall
of the Roman Empire, the advent of the euro in January 1999 indeed qualifies as an epochal
event. The Roman emperor Gaius Diocletianus, A.D. 286-301, reformed the coinage and
established a single currency throughout the realm. The advent of the euro also marks the first
time that sovereign countries voluntarily have given up their monetary independence to foster
economic integration. The euro thus represents a historically unprecedented experiment, the
outcome of which will have far-reaching implications. If the euro survives the Eurozone crisis
then it will, along with the dollar, dominate the world of international finance. In addition, a
successful euro may give a powerful impetus to the political unionization of Europe.13

12

Special Report,” BBC news, November 21 1997, accessed April 11, 2015,
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According to Eun and Resnick (2012), the euro should be viewed as a product of
historical evolution toward an ever-deepening integration of Europe which began with the
formation of the European Economic Community in 1958. The European Monetary System
(EMS) was created in 1979 to establish a European zone of monetary stability as members were
required to restrict fluctuations of their currencies. In 1991, the Maastricht European council
reached agreement on a draft treaty on the European Union, which called for the introduction
of a single European currency by 1999. With the launching of the euro on January 1, 1999, the
European Monetary Union (EMU) was created. The EMU is a logical extension of the EMS and
the European Currency Unit was the precursor of the euro. Indeed, ECU contracts were required
by EU law to be converted to euro contracts on a one-to-one basis.14 This will be discussed in
more detail in the next chapter when we cover the background of the monetary unification.15
The development of monetary union in Europe was a gradual political process.
Monetary union was a goal as early as 1969 when the Werner Report was published. It was
however, only in 1989 that steps were put forward to achieve this by the Delors Commission.
The euro is today used by seventeen member states of the European Union. To find out how the
euro became this popular we will have to discuss the history of its formation.

Background of Monetary Unification
Barry Eichengreen, in his article European Monetary unification, gives a good narrative
of how the euro was formed. The origins of the current movement for European monetary
unification extend back at least to the founding of the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC) which subsequently became the Organization for Economic Cooperation

14
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and Development, or OECD, in 1948. One of the OEEC's first accomplishments was the
European Payments Union (established in 1950), in which the countries of Western Europe
pooled their international reserves and coordinated their policies with the goal of reestablishing
current account convertibility.16
The European Payments Union was established at the end of 1958. In 1962 the
Commission of the European Communities drafted its first plan for monetary union, which
included a deadline for completion within nine years. This plan, in retrospect, was overly
ambitious for an association of nations whose only collective achievements had been the
European Coal and Steel Community, an atomic energy community (EURATOM), a customs
union (the European Economic Community), and the Common Agricultural Policy of farmproduct subsidization. The sole accomplishment of the 1962 initiative was a Committee of
Central Bank Governors (set up in 1964), which did not develop an operational role until the
1970s.17
So long as the Bretton Woods System persisted, pressure for exchange rate stabilization
was minimal, because intra-European exchange rates were indirectly pegged by their parity
commitments to the U. S. dollar, but once Bretton Woods began to unravel, the pressure
intensified. At the Hague Summit in 1969, European governments appointed a committee
chaired by Pierre Werner, then Prime Minister of Luxembourg, to draw up a new plan. The
Werner Report, completed in 1970, called for monetary union within ten years. It sketched out a
transition to take place in stages.18

16

Barry Eichengreen, “European Monetary Unification,” Journal of Economic Literature (1993): 1321-57,
accessed May 26, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2728243.pdf.
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Ibid.,1323

10
In the first stage, exchange rate fluctuations would be limited and governments would
begin to coordinate their monetary and fiscal policies. In the second stage, exchange rate
variability and price divergences would be further reduced. In the third stage, exchange rates
would be irrevocably fixed, capital controls would be removed, and an EC system of central
banks, modeled loosely on the U. S. Federal Reserve System, would assume control of the
monetary policies of the member countries. The size of the EC budget would be increased
dramatically, and the Community would coordinate national tax and expenditure program.19
The authors of the Werner Report preferred single currency to fixed exchange rates between
national currencies, but they suggested that both alternatives were viable and their benefits
broadly comparable.

The Delors Report
In June 1998, the European Council meeting in Hanover, Germany, chaired by the
president of the European commission, Jacques Delors, set up a committee to study the
feasibility of supplementing the single market with a monetary union. The report, which came to
be known as Delors Report, submitted in April 1989, indicated that monetary union would be
achieved in three stages, moving toward economic and monetary coordination to a single
currency with an independent European central bank and rules to govern the size and financing
of national budget deficits. 20
The Delors Report provided the framework for intergovernmental negotiations in 1991.
Many of its conclusions found their way into the Maastricht Treaty. Nothing is more revealing of
continuity and change in discussions of European monetary unification than the similarities and

19

Barry Eichengreen, “European Monetary Unification,” Journal of Economic Literature (1993): 1321-57,
accessed May 26, 2015, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2728243.pdf.
20
Ibid., 1324

11
differences between the Werner and Delors Reports. The Delors Report, like its predecessor,
sought to achieve monetary union in less than a decade. Both documents recommended
proceeding gradually, The Delors Report described a transition in three stages. Like the Werner
Report, the Delors Report emphasized the need for fiscal harmonization.21
But there were differences between the Werner and Delors Report. For instance, there
was greater attention paid in the latter to mechanism design. The clearest illustration is the
Delors Report’s insistence on the early introduction of a single currency to insure "the
irreversibility of the move to monetary union."22

The Maastricht Treaty
In December 1989, following the appearance of the Delors Report, the governments of
the EC member states convened an Intergovernmental Conference to prepare amendments to
the Treaty of Rome (the basic law of the European Community). The Conference commenced
work in December 1990, one year later, producing draft amendments in the form of a treaty.
Following the Delors Report, the Maastricht Treaty described a monetary union to be achieved
in three stages. But where the Delors Report depicted the transitional stages in rather schematic
terms, the Maastricht Treaty was specific about their features.
Stage one: was to be marked by the removal of capital controls, the reduction of
international inflation and interest rate differentials, and the increasing stability of intraEuropean exchange rates. Member countries must strengthen the independence of their central
banks and otherwise bring domestic laws into conformance with the treaty. The inauguration of

21
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this stage in July 1990 was marked by the removal of Europe's most important capital controls.
Less progress was made, however, in achieving convergence of inflation and interest rates and
their underlying determinants, and a foreign exchange market crisis in September 1992 led to
exchange rate changes not anticipated by policy makers and to the re-imposition of some capital
controls.23
Stage two, started at the beginning of 1994. It was to be characterized by the further
convergence of national economic policies and by the creation of a temporary entity, the
European Monetary Institute (EMI), to coordinate member country monetary policies in the
final phases of the transition and to plan the move to monetary union. If during Stage 2 the
Council of Ministers, made up of ministers of economics or finance from each national
government, decided (by qualified majority, where each country's vote is weighted by its size)
that a majority of member countries meet the preconditions for monetary union, which are
detailed in the Maastricht Treaty, it may recommend that the Council of Heads of State vote (by
qualified majority) on whether to inaugurate stage three. 24
To prevent the indefinite continuation of Stage two, the treaty required the EC Heads of
State or Government to meet no later than December 31st, 1996 to assess whether a majority
of EC member countries satisfy the conditions for monetary union and to decide whether to set
a date for the beginning of Stage three. If no date has been set by the end of 1997, Stage three
will begin on January 1st, 1999.25
Stage three. Upon the inauguration of stage three, exchange rates would be irrevocably
fixed. The EMI would be succeeded by the European Central Bank, which would assume control

23
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13
of the monetary policies of the participating countries. The Council of Ministers will decide when
to replace their national currencies with the single European currency. It would do so on the
first day of Stage three. If it chose otherwise, the ECB would simply instruct its operating arms,
the national central banks, to convert their national currencies into one another at par until
these were replaced by the single currency26

A Brief History of the Euro
The euro was launched in 1999. It was first introduced as the currency for electronic
payments--including debit and credit cards, loans, and for accounting purposes. During this
initial phase old currencies were used for cash only. The second phase was launched in 2002,
when euro coins and bank notes appeared in physical form. It is important to note that each
country has its own distinct form of the euro coin. The following table summarizes the major
political decisions from 1989 to 2002 that led to the creation of the euro.27

26
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Table 2.1 Chronology of the European Union

February 1986 : Signing of the single European Act, advancing Economic and political
integration within the European Community
April 1989: The Delors Report calls for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) LEADING TO A
SINGLE European currency through three stages.
June 1989: The Madrid Summit of the European council agrees that Stage one of EMU will
start July 1, 1990. Stage 1 includes completing the internal market and removing all obstacles
to financial integration.
October 1990: The Rome Summit of the European council agrees that stage two of EMU will
begin January 1,1994
December 1990: The Dublin Summit of the European council marks the beginning of
intergovernmental conferences on EMU and political union.
February 1992: Signing of the Maastricht treaty to establish the European Union, the
successor of the European Community.
June 1992: Danish voters narrowly reject the Maastricht treaty
September 1992: Currency crises force Britain and Italy to abandon the Exchange Rate
Mechanism
July 1993: Member states agree to widen the “narrow” band in the ERM from 2.25% TO 15%
around the central rates.
January 1994: Stage two of the EMU starts.
May 1995: The European Commission adopts a green paper “ on the practical arrangements
for the introduction of a single currency ( a green paper is a document intended to stimulate
discussion and start a process of consultation)
December 1995: The euro is officially adopted as the name of the new single currency
May 1998: Special meeting of the European council decides that eleven member states satisfy
the conditions of adopting a common currency.
June 1998: The European Central Bank and the Eurosystem are set up
January 1999: Stage three of the EMU begins and the euro begins to trade on financial
markets
January 2001: Greece adopts the Euro
January 2002: Euro notes and coins enter in to circulation in all participating member states.
Source: Lars and Drea (2010).
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As the euro was introduced, each national currency of the 11 euro countries was
irrevocably fixed to the euro at a conversion rate as of January 1 1999. The conversion rates are
shown in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2. Euro conversion rates
Austrian schilling
Belgian Franc
Dutch guilder
Finish markka
French franc
German mark
Irish punt
Italian lira
Luxembourg franc
Portuguese escudo
Spanish peseta
U.S. dollar
Japanese yen
British pound
Source: Eun Cheol S., and Bruce G. Resnick. (2012)

13,7603
40,3399
2.20371
5.94573
6.55957
1.95583
0.78756
1936.27
40.3399
200.482
166.386
1.2519
109.65
0.8245

On January 1, 2002, euro notes and coins were introduced to circulation while national
bills and coins were being gradually withdrawn. Once the changeover was completed by July 1,
2002, the legal tender status of national currencies was canceled, leaving the euro as the sole
legal tender in the Eurozone countries. Monetary policies of the Eurozone countries are now
conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB) headquartered in Frankfurt, Germany and whose
primary objective was to maintain price stability. The independence of the ECB is legally

16
guaranteed so that in conducting its monetary policy, it will cannot be unduly subjected to
political pressure from any member countries or institutions.28
It is important to note that the national central banks of the Eurozone countries will not
disappear. They form the Eurosystem together with the European Central Bank which is in a way
similar to the Federal Reserve System of the United States. The first function of the Eurosystem
is to, define and implement the common monetary policy of the union. Second, it’s to conduct
foreign exchange operations and finally, to hold and manage the official reserve of the euro
member states.29
In addition, Governors of national central banks will sit on the Governing Council of the
ECB. Although national central banks will have to follow the policies of the ECB, they will
continue to perform important functions in their jurisdictions, such as collecting resources and
managing payment systems. 30 Figure 2.1 below shows the behavior of exchange rate between
the dollar and the euro since the euro’s inception.

28
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Fig 2.1: The daily dollar-Euro exchange rate since the Euros inception

Source: Eun Cheol S., and Bruce G. Resnick (2012)
From the table above we can see panel A plots the daily dollar- euro exchange rate since
the inception of the euro. As can be seen from panel A, since its introduction at $1.18 per euro
in January 1999, the euro was steadily depreciating against the dollar, reaching a low point of
$0.83 per euro in October 2000. The depreciation of the euro during this period reflected the
robust performance of the U.S. economy and massive European investments in the United
States. From the start of 2002 however, the euro began to appreciate against the dollar,
reaching a rough parity by July 2002. This, in turn, reflected a slowdown of the U.S. economy
and lessening European investments in the United States.31
The euro continued to strengthen against the dollar, reaching $1.60 per euro in July
2008 before it started to fall as the global financial crisis spread. During a crisis period, the dollar
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tends to become stronger reflecting investors preference for the dollar as safe haven. Although
the euro began to rebound in early 2009, it started to fall against the dollar as Europe’s
sovereign debt crisis hurt the euro’s credibility.32
As the issue of the Euro crisis is very recent, there has been an ongoing debate, and
articles have been written, trying to explain how the crisis could have happened that quick,
noting the fact that the euro is only sixteen years old.

Did the Eurozone Meet the Criteria For OCA?
According to Robert Mundell, an optimal currency area is a geographic area in which a
single currency would create the greatest economic benefit. To analyze if the Eurozone an
optimal currency area this thesis will look at each of the requirements that Mundell outlines and
use them in analyzing the Eurozone. This thesis will then use this information to determine if the
Eurozone meets the criteria for an OCA.
Capital and Labor Mobility- According to the theory of optimal currency areas, the
relevant criterion for identifying and designing a common currency zone is the degree of factor
(i.e. capital and labor) mobility within the zone; a high degree of factor mobility would provide
an adjustment mechanism providing an alternative to country specific monetary/currency
adjustments. Considering the high degree of capital and labor mobility in the U.S., one might
argue that the United States is an OCA; it would be suboptimal for each of the fifty states to
issue its own currency.33
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If we compare the high degree of U.S. capital and labor mobility to that of Europe we
find that it is the opposite, with Europe having low labor mobility, the financial capital is mobile
but physical capital seems to be less mobile; for instance, “unemployed workers in Helsinki are
not very likely to move to Milan or Stuttgart for job opportunities because of cultural, religious,
linguistic and other barriers”.34
Fiscal transfers. Fiscal transfers are necessary in order for a region to become an OCA,
the Eurozone does not seem to have a fiscal transfer system like that of the United States there
is no large scale method of recycling the taxes raised in those parts of the Eurozone that are
doing well in to higher spending for those part of the Eurozone that are doing poorly.35
These considerations taken, together suggest that the European monetary union will
involve significant economic costs due to the recession. France and Germany often let the
budget deficit exceed the 3 % limit. This violation of the stability pact compromises the fiscal
discipline necessary for supporting the euro and makes the Eurozone not an OCA.36
Is the Eurozone an OCA? Mundell (1961) claimed that the Eurozone is not currently an
OCA, but it can be if steps are taken to make labor more mobile and to facilitate supernational
employment policies.
In Western Europe the creation of the Common Market is regarded by many as an
important step toward eventual political union, and the subject of a common currency
for the six countries has been much discussed. One can cite the well-known position of
J. E. Meade who argues that the conditions for a common currency in Western Europe
do not exist, and that, especially because of the lack of labor mobility, a system of
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flexible exchange rates would be more effective in promoting balance-of-payments
equilibrium and internal stability. The apparently opposite view of Tibor Scitovsky who
favors a common currency because he believes that it would induce a greater degree of
capital mobility, but further adds that steps must be taken to make labor more mobile
and to facilitate supranational employment policies. In terms of the language of this
paper Meade favors national currency areas while Scitovsky gives qualified approval to
the idea of a single currency area in Western Europe (A Theory of Optimum Currency
Area Page 661)
Based on the theory and organization of the Eurozone, we can conclude that it is not an
OCA, in the next section we are going to look at data from Eurostat to support the conclusion
that it is not an OCA.
We base our reasoning on the following facts. First, the Eurozone has a low degree of
capital and labor mobility, because of cultural, religious, linguistic and other barriers. Europeans
cannot find employment in a different country if they do not speak the language. Different
European countries have different cultures and this makes labor mobility difficult. Second, fiscal
transfers are almost nonexistent as the well-off countries like Germany are reluctant to bail
poorer countries like Greece because of political reasons.
The third reason why the Eurozone cannot be considered an OCA is that the Eurozone
member countries are in different phases of the Business cycle. In other words, they experience
different shocks and growth rates. It is important for all participants in the Eurozone to have
similar business cycles so that economic booms are shared and the European Central Bank can
fight economic recessions by promoting growth and containing inflation. The following data
from Eurostat shows that the sector diversification of some members of the Eurozone are not
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homogenous enough to result in similar business cycles. As some countries, like Belgium, rely
heavily on retail trade while others, like Greece and Slovenia, rely on industrial production.
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Table 2.3: Volume of Retail Trade

Source: Eurostat
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Table 2.4: Industrial Production

Source: Eurostat
Another reason why the Eurozone is not an OCA today is because some member
countries are violating the Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty was responsible for the
creation of the Euro and as long as some countries keep on breaking the rules, the Eurozone will

24
never achieve OCA status. The Maastricht Treaty specified a set of macroeconomic convergence
criteria that EU countries would need to satisfy in order to qualify for admission to the EMU and
once they are a member, they still need to maintain this. These main economic performance
criteria are as follows:
1. The country's inflation rate must be no more than 1.5 % points above the average of
the three EU member states with the lowest inflation.
2. The country must have maintained a stable exchange rate within the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) without devaluing on its own initiative.
3. The country must have a public-sector deficit no higher than 3 % of its GDP.
4. The country must have a public debt that is below or approaching a reference level of
60% of its GDP.
5. The country’s long-term interest rates must be no higher than 2 % points above
those of the best three EU member states with the lowest long-run interest rates37
The criteria for convergence broken by some countries are discussed below. The first
convergence rule broken is that a country's inflation rate should converge to a level not too far
above that of the community's low inflation countries. Specifically, the average rate of CPI
inflation over the preceding 12 months must not exceed the inflation rates of the three lowestinflation member states by more than 1.5 percentage points in other words, all members with a
single currency should maintain the same inflation rates.

37

Elias Dinopoulos and Iordanis Petsas, “Greece and the Euro,” (2000): 1-20, accessed June 3,
2015,http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.199.5492&rep=rep1&type=pdf

25
Figure 2.2. Annual Inflation Rates in ascending order

Source: Eurostat

As we can see from the above table in the Euro-member countries, Greece is the nation
with the lowest annual inflation rate of -1.8% and Austria is the highest with an inflation rate of
0.9%, and that is a difference of more than 1.5%. According to this data these countries are in
violation of the above stated rule in the Maastricht Treaty as it clearly shows that these
countries do not have the same inflation rates. It is important to note that these values include
both inflation and deflation and this criteria only applies if the deflation values are included. The
Maastricht rule does not mention deflation.
The second convergence condition mentioned in the Maastricht Treaty, and broken by
some Eurozone members, is government debt. According to the treaty, budget deficits should
be no larger than 3 % of GDP and gross public debts no larger than 60 % of GDP38. As we can see
from the tables in the appendix, in the year 2014, only Denmark (+1.2%), Germany (+0.7%),
Estonia and Luxembourg (+0.6% each) registered a government surplus. The lowest government
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deficits in percentage of GDP were recorded in Lithuania (-0.7%), Latvia (-1.4%) and Romania (1.5%).
Twelve Member States had deficits higher than 3% of GDP: Cyprus (-8.8%), Spain (5.8%), Croatia and the United Kingdom (both -5.7%), Slovenia (-4.9%), Portugal (-4.5%), Ireland
(-4.1%), France (-4.0%), Greece (-3.5%), Belgium, Poland and Finland (all -3.2%). At the end of
2014, the lowest ratios of government debt to GDP were recorded in Estonia (10.6%),
Luxembourg (23.6%), Bulgaria (27.6%), Romania (39.8%) and Latvia (40.0%). Sixteen Member
States had government debt ratios higher than 60% of GDP, and were in violation of the
Maastricht Treaty with the highest registered in Greece (177.1%), Italy (132.1%), Portugal (130.2
%), Ireland (109.7%), Cyprus (107.5%) and Belgium (106.5%).
Based on the above data, it can be concluded that the EU is not currently an OCA, but it
is headed in that direction. The European Union countries must have met the criteria prior to
entry into the Union, but the crisis has caused them to exceed the Maastricht criteria, and the
crisis is what every critic talked about as the test for whether the EU would survive. The fact
that the Eurozone did not meet the criteria for an OCA led many economists to predict that the
euro experiment would fail. In the next chapter a survey of the literature on the Eurozone
critics, and the causes of the Eurozone crisis will be examined.
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CHAPTER 3: THE EUROZONE BETWEEN AUSTERITY AND DEFAULT
From the previous chapter it was established that the Eurozone is not an OCA, and that
the Eurozone is in crisis today for the following reasons: first the Eurozone is not an OCA
because it has a low degree of capital and labor mobility, this is caused by cultural, religious,
linguistic and other barriers. Second, fiscal transfers are almost non-existent, as the well-off
countries like Germany are reluctant to bail out poorer countries like Greece. Economists, such
as Lapavitsas, believe that the Eurozone crisis is the result of incorporating weaker peripheral
countries like Greece, Spain and Portugal, and, without a fiscal transfer mechanism, the financial
crisis was certain to bring about a Eurozone crisis.
It is interesting to note that a number of politicians, economist, and professors
predicted the Eurozone crisis before it started in 2009. First, Warren Mosler predicted in 2001
that the European Central Bank will be forced to intervene, which it did in 2009. Mossler stated
in an interview he participated in 2001, “History and logic dictate that the credit sensitive euro12 national governments and banking system will be tested. The market’s arrows will inflict an
initially narrow liquidity crisis, which will immediately infect and rapidly arrest the entire euro
payments system. Only the inevitable, currently prohibited, direct intervention of the ECB will
be capable of performing the resurrection, and from the ashes of that fallen flaming star an
immortal sovereign currency will no doubt emerge.”39
Second, Margaret Thatcher, the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, warned
back in 1990 that the single currency could not accommodate stronger and weaker economies.
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She stated “We had arguments which might persuade both the Germans — who would be
worried about the weakening of anti-inflation policies — and the poorer countries — who must
be told that they would not be bailed out of the consequences of a single currency, which would
therefore devastate their inefficient economies (nine people who saw the Greek crisis coming
years before everyone else did page 4). Third, Milton Freidman, in a keynote address to the
Bank of Canada in 2000, offered some caution when asked about the future of the euro. He
said,” I think the euro is in its honeymoon phase. I hope it succeeds, but I have very low
expectations for it. I think that differences are going to accumulate among the various countries
and that non-synchronous shocks are going to affect them.”40
Fourth, Arnulf Baring, a German political scientist offered predictions in his 1997 book
Schieter Deutschland. The following quote was translated from his book:
They will say that we are subsidizing scroungers, lounging in cafés on the Mediterranean
beaches. Monetary union, in the end, will result in a gigantic blackmailing operation.
When we Germans demand monetary discipline, other countries will blame their
financial woes on that same discipline, and by extension, on us. Moreover, they will
perceive us as a kind of economic policeman. We risk once again becoming the most
hated in Europe. 41
Another Economist who predicted the Eurozone crisis before it actually happened was
Wynne Godley. Godley wrote about his concerns in 1992 for the London Review of Books:
What happens if a whole country—a potential ‘region’ in a fully integrated community—
suffers a structural setback? So long as it is a sovereign state, it can devalue its currency.
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It can then trade successfully at full employment provided its people accept the
necessary cut in their real incomes. With an economic and monetary union, this
recourse is obviously barred, and its prospect is grave indeed unless federal budgeting
arrangements are made which fulfil a redistributive role. ... If a country or region has no
power to devalue, and if it is not the beneficiary of a system of fiscal equalisation, then
there is nothing to stop it suffering a process of cumulative and terminal decline leading,
in the end, to emigration as the only alternative to poverty or starvation.42
Stephanie Bell Kelton, in an essay published in 2002, argued that it will be almost
impossible to stabilize the Eurozone.
Countries that wish to compete for benchmark status, or to improve the terms on
which they borrow, will have an incentive to reduce fiscal deficits or strive for budget
surpluses. In countries where this becomes the overriding policy objective, we should
not be surprised to find relatively little attention paid to the stabilization of output and
employment. In contrast, countries that attempt to eschew the principles of “sound”
finance may find that they are unable to run large, counter-cyclical deficits, as lenders
refuse to provide sufficient credit on desirable terms. Until something is done to enable
member states to avert these financial constraints (e.g. political union and the
establishment of a federal [EU] budget or the establishment of a new lending
institution, designed to aid member states in pursuing a broad set of policy objectives),
the prospects for stabilization in the Eurozone appear grim.43
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Randall Wray was critical of the structure of the Eurozone, this is a quote from his 1998
book, Understanding Modern Money:
Under the EMU, monetary policy is supposed to be divorced from fiscal policy,
with a great degree of monetary policy independence in order to focus on the
primary objective of price stability. Fiscal policy, in turn will be tightly
constrained by criteria which dictate maximum deficit-to-GDP and debt-todeficit ratios. Most importantly, as Goodhart recognizes, this will be the world’s
first modern experiment on a wide scale that would attempt to break the link
between a government and its currency. ... As currently designed, the EMU will
have a central bank (the ECB) but it will not have any fiscal branch. This would
be much like a US which operated with a Fed, but with only individual state
treasuries. It will be as if each EMU member country were to attempt to operate
fiscal policy in a foreign currency; deficit spending will require borrowing in that
foreign currency according to the dictates of private markets.44
All these criticisms have one thing in common, they all argue that the Eurozone will not
work because of problems with fiscal transfers. In the next section we review the recent
literature on the causes of the crisis.
As the euro is only sixteen years old, many economist have debated how the Eurozone
crisis could have happened that quickly. Lapavitsas, Kaltenbrunner, Lindo (2010) claim that the
Eurozone crisis that broke out at the end of 2009 was fundamentally caused by the precarious
integration of peripheral countries in the Eurozone. Its immediate causes however lie with the
global financial crisis of 2007-2009. Speculative mortgage lending by U.S. financial institutions
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and trading of resultant derivative securities by international banks created a vast bubble in
2001-2007, leading to crisis and recession. The public debt crisis represents stage two of a
problem that started in 2007, according to Lapavitsas et al. 45
Another cause of the euro crisis is institutional bias and malfunction in the Eurozone.
According to Lapavitsas et al, the European Monetary Union is supported by a host of treaties
and multilateral agreements, including the Maastricht Treaty, the Growth and Stability Pact, and
the Lisbon Strategy. It is also supported by the European Central Bank (ECB) in charge of
monetary policy across the Eurozone. The combination of these institutions has produced a mix
of monetary, fiscal and labor market policies with powerful social implications.46
The third factor that caused the crisis according to Lapavitsas et al (2010) is national
competitiveness within the Eurozone which has depended on the conditions of work and the
performance of labor markets. The European Employment Strategy has encouraged greater
flexibility of employment as well as more part-time and temporary work. There has been
considerable pressure on pay and conditions, a race to the bottom across the Eurozone. The
actual application of this policy across the Eurozone has varied considerably, depending on
welfare systems, trade union organization, and social and political history. This has deepened
the crisis.47
Woods (2012) offered a different view of what caused the euro crisis. He argued that
the crisis in Europe is about political opportunism and complacency rather than just debt.
Woods explains that many factors have contributed to the European Union’s debt crisis: turbo
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capitalism, deficient regulations, and policy errors. These are the factors that commentators and
an angry public readily point to because they appear more immediately connected to the
current malaise. Less obvious but more profound are historical, sociological, psychological,
opportunist and criminal influences, tiring economies with large state sectors, high taxation,
expensive social security provisions, and extensive redistribution these features derive from and
are the responsibility of national populations and their political classes. They indicate that the
crisis is about more than debt alone.48
Finally, the institutions of the Eurozone are more than plain technical arrangements to
support the euro as domestic common currency as well as world money; rather, they have had
profound social and political implications. They have protected the interests of financial capital
by lowering inflation, fostering liberalization, and ensuring rescue operations in times of crisis.
They have also worsened the position of labor compared to capital.49
Kouretas (2010) noted that a number of factors have contributed to the fiscal crisis that
Greece has been experiencing since October 2009. Some of these factors are endogenous,
meaning that they have to do with the structure of the Greek economy itself; these include, but
are not limited to, the prolonged macroeconomic imbalances that the Greek economy faces,
and its credibility problem of macroeconomic policy. Other factors are exogenous and have to
do with the implications of the recent financial turmoil and the timing of the response by the
ECB to the Greek financial crisis. This will now be discussed in more detail.
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The two main endogenous causes of the Greek financial crisis are running consistently
widening public deficits and declining external competitiveness. According to the EU statistics
agency, the Greek budget deficit for 2009 increased to 15.4% of GDP. This increased public
expenditure led to a dramatic increase in borrowing requirements and high levels of
accumulated public debt. The statistics put the level of central government debt as of December
31, 2009 at €29,805 Billion. The worst part is that the debt-to-GDP ratio will continue to increase
in the coming years because of the €110 billion EU rescue package,50 and that the government
debt under public debt agency’s management represents 93% of the total central government
debt that is outstanding (Figure 3.1 in the appendix)
Kouretas (2010) argues that Greece’s public debt grew from the early 1970’s to the
present time in relation to the political regime and the different governments in office. The
inauguration of the socialist government led by the late Andreas Papandreou implemented an
economic policy program that was mainly based on the income of the average Greek household
through extensive borrowing from the markets. This borrowing was used in an effort to raise the
standard of living.51 Figure 3.2 in the Appendix shows Greek public debt grew from the early
1970s to the present time in relation to the political regime and the different governments in
office. We can see that the debt/GDP ratio was constant until 1979 at very low levels, about
25%, before the socialist government led by Papandreou took over.
The second endogenous cause of the Greek financial crisis is the decline in
competitiveness since EMU entry led to a persistent deficit in the current account. Increased
“twin deficits” together with the lack of structural reform in home regarding labor market
flexibility, Social Security and market competition obliged Greece to issue new bonds at short
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maturity periods and at higher interest rates as compared to other Eurozone countries like
Germany. The ability of the Greek government to pay its debt has been questioned due to its
high sovereign debt.52
As mentioned earlier, exogenous causes have to do with the implications of the recent
financial turmoil and the timing of the response of Europe to the Greek financial crisis. Kouretas
(2010) discusses three exogenous causes of the Greek Financial crisis. First, the Eurozone
governments, especially Germany, refused to give a clear signal indicating their readiness to
support Greece. Most of their unhelpfulness was partly political as some countries used the
Maastricht Treaty as a reason not to support Greece.
According to Kouretas, the second exogenous factor that contributed to the instability
of the Greek economy was the lack of fiscal transfers at the EU level. This is because the
European Union is a monetary union and not an economic one with a federal budget. The EU
common monetary policy is set at a supranational level, but its economic policy, like the
budgetary policies and wage policies, is still in the hands of national policy makers. The third
exogenous factor is the impact from the global economic crisis. Greece and its major trading
partners in the Balkan Peninsula were also hit by the 2007 global crisis. This originated from the
U.S. sub-prime loan market crisis. The recession may have hit Greece somewhat less than other
countries because of its relatively small manufacturing sector and of the large share of the
shadow economy which is estimated to be 25% to 30% of GDP.53
Gibson (2012) claims that the origins of the euro crisis were caused by the following
reasons. One of the first origins of the crisis was Greece’s entry in to the Eurozone because of its
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competitiveness problem. Gibson admits that the entry of Greece into the Eurozone was a
mixed blessing, as this entry enabled Greece to experience a period of prolonged and robust
growth as well as low inflation, but the country continued to run large fiscal imbalances, and the
country’s competitiveness, already a problem upon euro area entry, continued to deteriorate.54
Gibson also noted that even though Greek inflation was low during the 2001-2009
period by the country’s historical standard, inflation was relatively high by the euro area
standards, as inflation was on average more than 1% higher per year than the rest of the euro
area. In the period 2001–2009, competitiveness, as measured by consumer prices, declined by
around 20%; and, as measured by unit labor costs, competitiveness declined by about 25%. With
relatively high real growth rates and declining competitiveness, the current account deficit,
which had already topped 7% of GDP in 2001, rose to about 14.8% of GDP in both 2007 and
2008.55
Jean (2012) argued, since the euro crisis erupted in early 2010, the European policy
discussion has mostly emphasized its fiscal roots. Beyond short term assistance, reflection or
reform has focused on the need to strengthen the fiscal framework at European Union and
national levels. Jean questions if the Europeans are right to see the strengthening of the fiscal
framework as the main, or possibly the only, precondition of restoring trust in the euro, or is this
emphasis misguided?
Jean (2012) believed that just focusing on fiscal roots is not the proper solution as other
things need to be fixed as well. Jean suggested the following three factors. One factor included

54

Heather Gibson, Stephen Hall, and George Tavlas, “The Greek Financial Crisis: Growing Imbalances and
Sovereign Spreads,” Journal of International Money and Finance, no. 3 (2012): 1, accessed May 20,
2015, http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0261560611001513/1-s2.0-S0261560611001513-main.pdf?_tid=5d2dab58ff22-11e4-bcf8-00000aab0f02&acdnat=1432148558_af9f2ce7bd14f75d3d6398aa58c9fae5.
55
Ibid.,502

36
credit booms and the perverse effects of negative real interest rates. Countries where credit to
the non-tradable sector gave rise to a sustained rise in inflation are examples of issues that have
been ignored and largely disappeared from the policy agenda at the head-of-state level.56
Second, real exchange rate misalignments within the euro area and current account imbalances
are largely considered to be of lesser importance or mere symptoms of the underlying fiscal
imbalances and ignored. Third, the role of capital flows from northern to southern Europe and
their sudden reversal are rarely discussed by academics and central bankers, though the sudden
reversal of north-south capital flows inside the euro area is fragmenting the single market and
creating major imbalances within the euro system of central banks. These three important
conditions are ignored because fixing the fiscal framework is usually emphasized, according to
Jean (2012).57
Wihlborg, Willet, and Zhang (2010) argue that the crisis in Greece and other mainly
southern Eurozone countries has been discussed primarily as a fiscal issue. However, this crisis is
not fiscal alone, and it does not only affect Greece, as current account deficits of countries like
Spain and Portugal have received less attention in spite of the relatedness of current account
and fiscal deficits. Wihlborg, Willet, and Zhang argue that the failure of many countries within
the Eurozone to develop adequate internal adjustment mechanisms is also an important factor
behind the crisis. The authors present data to support their argument by demonstrating the lack
of price and cost convergence in the Eurozone since 1999.58
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Wihlborg, Willet and Zhang (2010) recommend that the responsibility of the European
Debt Surveillance Authority (EDSA) should include surveillance of intra euro payments flow,
imbalances and adjustments in labor and good markets, and setting benchmarks for the
Eurozone guarantees of sovereign debt based on the ability to adjust internally; thereby a
potential moral hazard problem of an implicit euro zone guarantee of countries sovereign debt
could be avoided.59
Maurer (2010) claims that there are two hypotheses put forward to explain what caused
the Eurozone debt crisis. First, it is a malign mixture of fiscal indiscipline and speculative attacks
by markets that have gone out of control. Second, the crisis has been caused by a faulty design
of the European Monetary Union:60
To explain the second hypothesis, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the development of the
average government debt-to-GDP ratio of those Eurozone countries that suffer currently from
increasing risk premiums on their sovereign debt. It is important to note that the very low
interest rates which the governments of these countries faced after the beginning of the EMU
did not give rise to a tremendous government borrowing boom. Instead, it was the private
sector of these countries who ran into debt because they borrowed too much.
Figure 3.2 shows how the international net debt-to-GDP position of the current account
surplus countries of the Eurozone has developed over the same period. Even though the
numbers do not exactly match, the symmetry of the development is remarkable.

59

Ibid.,1
Rainer Maurer, “The Eurozone Debt Crisis - a Simple Theory, Some Not so Pleasant Empirical
Calculations and an Unconventional Proposal” (master's thesis, Hochschule Pforzheim University, 2010),
1-33, accessed June 24, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1621828.
60

38
Figure 3.1. Average long term interest rates and Debt-to-GDP ratios of Greece, Portugal, Ireland
and Spain.

Source Maurer 2010

Figure 3.2. International net debt position of Eurozone debtor and creditor countries

Source: Maurer, 2010
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The main question that arises is what caused the very low real interest rates which gave
rise to a private sector borrowing boom? Figure 3.3 suggests that these low interest rates were
caused by the formation of the EMU. If we observe Figure 3.3, we can see that with the start of
the monetary union, the nominal interest rate spreads for long run government bonds of the 12
founding states of the monetary union literally disappeared as measured by the variance
coefficient. Inversely to this development the variance coefficient of the real interest rate did
significantly grow.61

Figure 3.3. Variance coefficients across the 12 EMU founding member states

Source: Maurer, 2010
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Before the monetary union, inflation rate differentials were more or less compensated
by nominal interest rate differentials. This is suggested by the Fisher equation hypothesis, which
is an economic theory that describes the relationship between inflation and both real and
nominal interest rates. After the start of the monetary union, this mechanism did not work any
longer. Instead, the convergence of nominal interest rates caused a divergence of real interest
rates, because significant inflation differentials remained across the member states of the
European Monetary Union.62 This caused real interest rates in high inflation countries like
Greece to be significantly lower than real interest rates in low inflation countries like Germany
over most of the period in question.63
In summary, Maurer argues that the Eurozone crisis was a result of a private sector
bubble. This occurred because there was a lot of private sector debt and much of the lending
was done by German banks so the system was bailed out to save the German bank.

Global Financial Crisis and the Eurozone Reaction
This section will look at how the Eurozone responded to the global financial crisis. It will
also discuss in detail the evolution of debt in the peripheral countries (Spain, Portugal and
Greece) and how this accumulation of debt led to a banking crisis, and how this banking crisis
combined with a continuing recession have made some governments in the Eurozone opt for
contraction of public expenditure, causing society to pay the price caused by the crisis.

A profusion of debt: if you cannot compete keep borrowing
It is hard to determine just how much debt the peripheral countries have because
governments are not giving accurate information regarding their own debt. This thesis analyzes

62
63

Ibid.,5
Ibid.,5

41
peripheral debt using information available as of December 31, 2009 based on data in Lapavitsas
(2012).

Table 3.1. Aggregate peripheral debt (end 2009)

42

Source: Lapavitsas et al (2012)
Based on the data contained in Table 3.1 we found that, first, Spanish debt was roughly
three and a half times the sum of Portuguese and Greek debt, the last two being fairly similar to
each other. Second, the composition of aggregate debt was quite different among the three
countries. The proportion of domestic to external debt stood at 67% to 33% for Spain, compared
to 53 % to 47 % for Portugal and 45 % to 55 % for Greece.
It seems that both Portugal and Greece were similarly indebted externally and
domestically, while Spain had a lower proportion of external debt. However, it is important to
note that all countries were heavily indebted abroad relative to GDP: Spain at 165% and
Portugal at 218%, and Greece at 162%. Third, the composition of aggregate debt was even more
strikingly different when the proportion of private to public debt was considered. Spain and
Portugal were quite similar; for Spain it was 87 % to13 %, and Portugal was 84% to 16 %.64
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Fourth, the composition of debt in terms of instruments was quite similar among the
three countries, standing roughly at one third short-term to two thirds long-term. But there
were significant differences in the composition of external debt, largely reflecting the different
weight of public debt in external debt. Thus, Greek external debt was preponderantly long-term,
since its dominant elements were public bonds. The external debt of the other two countries
tended to be shorter term, reflecting the heavier presence of the private sector (Lapavitsas
2012, page 66).
Another important aspect of aggregate peripheral debt was the composition of holders
by nationality. The data in Figures 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6 (in the appendix) refer only to securities, but
this was still a large part of external debt as can be seen in Table 3.1 above. Figures 3.4 to 3.6 in
the appendix show that the vast bulk of peripheral securities were held by the countries of the
Eurozone core, primarily France and Germany.65

Rescuing the Banks Once Again
The accumulation of debt by the countries of the periphery eventually led to a major
sovereign debt crisis in late 2009, starting with Greek public debt. Escalating public deficits and
manipulation of statistical data in Greece led to downgrades by rating agencies, rising spreads
and eventually loss of access to financial markets by the Greek state. The sovereign debt of
Spain and Portugal also came under heavy pressure but the real threat posed by the sovereign
debt crisis has been to the banks of the core countries of France and Germany.66
In early 2010, there emerged the danger of a full blown crisis for the banks of the core
that held significant volumes of peripheral debt. The vulnerable position of European banks was
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directly related to the accumulation of debt (both private and public) by peripheral countries
(Spain, Greece and Portugal), and the chief providers of credit to the periphery were banks of
the core (German and French banks) which had taken advantage of the single currency and the
associated removal of capital controls.67
The core banks exploited the new markets, generating revenues by lending to
corporations and governments as well as to households for housing and consumption. The
exposure of core banks to the periphery consequently rose throughout this period as shown in
Figures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9.

Figure 3.7 Eurocore bank exposure to Spain ($bn)

Source: Lapavitsas et al (2012) crisis in the Eurozone
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Figure 3.8. Eurocore bank exposure to Portugal ($bn)

Source: Lapavitsas et al (2012) crisis in the Eurozone
Figure 3.9 Eurocore bank exposure to Greece ($ bn)

Source: Lapavitsas et al (2012) crisis in the Eurozone
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The pressing need for public borrowing had been created by declining tax revenue due
to the recession as well as by the attempt to rescue the financial system and to avoid a
depression with cheap and abundant funding from the ECB. European banks were able to take
advantage of this opportunity.
The euro became the new funding currency in a peculiar “carry trade” where banks
obtained funds at low rates from the central bank to lend at much higher rates to states. During
this time the banks showed no real concern about exposure to sovereign debt in peripheral
countries and this is what caused the crisis according to Lapavitsas.68

The Aim of the European Support Package
In May 2010, after much procrastination, the European Union announced a support
package for Greece of 110 billion euro that was jointly put together with the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The Greek intervention acted as a pilot for a larger package, announced
on May 9-10th, of roughly 750 billion euros. The second package was aimed at European
financial markets in general and received contributions from the EU, IMF, ECB and other major
central banks. Although the European leaders tried to convince the public that they were doing
this to save the European Monetary Union, by rescuing peripheral countries the underlying aim
was to bail out the banks of the core countries who were facing a wave of losses and further
funding difficulties.69
Another reason why the Europeans decided to bail out Greece was because a weaker
euro would also become less acceptable as an international reserve currency, thus harming the
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potential for expansion of European financial capital. Not to mention that it would further
worsen the funding problems that European banks faced on their balance sheets. The EU
contributed to the package by establishing the European stabilization mechanism. This resulted
in a new lending facility of 60 billion euro available to all EU member states. The facility was
financed through issuing European commission debt and this meant that it could be advanced
without the approval of national parliaments.70
The 60 billion euros pledge was too small an amount reflecting the limited resources
directly at the disposal of the EU. Therefore, the European Financial Stabilization Facility (EFSF)
was established and this would have up to 440 billion euros available to Eurozone members. The
EFSF was funded through the issuing of bonds guaranteed by Eurozone members on a pro rata
basis and the guarantees had to be approved by national parliaments and would come in to
force only after approval by countries representing at least 90% of the shares of the EFSF; thus,
the EU demonstrated a strong preference for market- based solutions to its financial problems.
The EFSF further rested on dominance by the core countries. In short, the package has shown a
profound lack of solidarity among the members of the Eurozone.71
The IMF also announced that it would cooperate with the EU by making available the
equivalent of 250 billion euro of its own financial assistance to supplement the European
stabilization mechanism. However, the IMF would only help if economic or fiscal adjustment
programs were implemented in other words austerity would be imposed on member states in
trouble as happened immediately in Greece.
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Society Pays the Price: Austerity and Further Social Cuts
The rescue package came with imposition of austerity on the periphery and increasingly
on the core. Confronted with a continuing recession and renewed banking crisis, several
governments of the Eurozone have opted for contraction of public expenditure; in effect, the
costs of rescuing the euro and the banks have been shifted to society at large.72 The mix of
austerity and liberalization within the Eurozone has been harsh on working people, but also
dangerous for the economy and society. Figures 3.10-3.15 (in the appendix) show the spread of
austerity and its likely impact on society, by the evolution of the components of aggregate
demand in three major Eurozone economies, Germany, France and Italy, as well as in three
peripheral economies at the epicenter of the public debt crisis, Spain, Portugal and Greece.
From Figures 3.10-3.16 in the appendix, we can see that Germany, Italy, France and
Spain performed much better when fueled by credit. The main source of growth for Germany
was external demand, reflecting its rising competitiveness within the Eurozone. Private
consumption played an important role in France, Portugal and Spain, but above all Greece.
Private investment was significant in Spain, partly reflecting the real estate bubble, but it was
generally weak across the sample. Italy experienced a stagnation in all respects.73
A complete collapse of aggregate demand was prevented through rising public
expenditure, which reflected the role and weight of the state in the economy. The impact of
recession on public finances was inevitable and predictable according to Lapavitsas, as tax
revenues fell, the attempt by the state to prevent depression led to public deficits in most
Eurozone countries, especially exceeding the limit of 3% of GDP imposed by the stability pact.

72
73

Ibid.,112
Ibid.,113

49
Even France, Italy and Germany exceeded the limit (deficits for 2010 were 8%, 5.3% and
5% respectively) in Spain, Portugal and Greece, where the problems of integration into the
Eurozone became sharply apparent, public deficits reached very high levels because this
austerity was imposed across the Eurozone, even the biggest economies of the Eurozone were
not spared as they aimed to comply with the 3% limit for the deficit within three years. 74
Germany announced a plan to cut public spending by 80 billion euros, lowering civil
servant wages, reducing the number of civil servants, reforming social security, cutting military
expenditure and reducing public subsidies. France followed the same path, while remaining
critical of Germany. The French government declared its intention to inscribe the limit to the
budget deficits in the constitution, following Germany in this respect, public savings of up to 100
billion euro were to be made until 2013 through freezing central government spending,
removing tax breaks and considering a pay freeze for public sector workers. Even Italy, which
had a sound economy for more than a decade, announced an austerity program of 24 billion
euro aimed at bringing its relatively small fiscal deficits down to 3% by 2012.75
The implications of austerity were likely to be severe since the policy was put on the
only component of aggregate demand that showed resilience in 2009, namely public
expenditure. Further pressure was also put on private consumption which was already in
trouble.76 On January 22nd, 2015, the ECB announced that it was launching a government bond
buying program which will pump hundreds of billions of dollars into a sagging Eurozone
economy, by purchasing sovereign debt from March of 2015 to the end of September 2016.
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Despite concerns from Germany that this could allow indebted countries to slacken
economic reform. Whether this would work is yet to be seen, as the ECB claims that only 20% of
purchases would be its responsibility. This means that the bulk of any potential losses, should a
European government default, would fall on its national Central Banks.77 From the literature, we
know that the Eurozone crisis was caused by the following reasons: the Eurozone having no
fiscal transfer mechanism and accumulation of debt. A good example are countries like Greece
who have so much debt that regular investors stopped buying its bonds or lending it money.
As several critics mentioned, the Eurozone will be tested during an asymmetric shock
like the global financial crisis. Indeed as a consequence of the financial crisis, the stability of the
Eurozone was tested and the critic’s prediction came true. A good example is Wray (1998), who
predicted that the Eurozone will have problems because of it having no sound fiscal transfer
mechanism. Margaret Thatcher, also warned against debt and the consequence that might
occur if the poorer countries are not bailed out, just like Warren Mossler predicted the ECB was
forced to provide liquidity through this bond buying program.
The critics were correct, that the financial crisis has raised the question of the Eurozone
survival. And Greece is at the center of this question. The next chapter looks at a case study of
Greece and raises the issue of whether Greece will remain in the Eurozone.
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Chapter 4: Case Study Greece
This thesis will not be complete without addressing the Greek crisis. This is because it is
Greece that triggered the Eurozone crisis, created fears of a global financial crisis and still throws
in to question the viability of the Eurozone itself. This section addresses why Greece was
allowed to join the Eurozone when it was not ready and did not meet the convergence criteria.
The impact of austerity on Greece will also be discussed because the crisis is creating a severe
impact on Greece which may force it to leave the Eurozone. Will conclude the section by
answering the question of whether Greece remain in the Eurozone?
When the European Monetary Union began in 1999 Greece was the only country in the
European Union that wanted to join the euro club, but was not allowed to, as it did not comply
with convergence criteria. However, only two years later, in June 2000, the European Council
(EC) made the final decision that Greece was ready to join the EMU. This was unexpected, given
the fact that in 1992, when the Maastricht Treaty was established to make rules on who can join
the EMU, Greece was the country with the greatest adjustment problems among the EU
member countries. Inflation and fiscal deficits were well above the EU average while the Greek
economy grew more slowly than that of the EU.78
This difficult economic situation occurred because of expansionary economic policies
during the 1980s, as public consumption was increased by a policy of deficit spending. The
expansionary fiscal policy supplemented by a loose monetary policy led to a high inflation and a
steady depreciation of the drachma. This meant that the increasing current account deficit could
only be financed by EU transfers and foreign loans.79
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So how did Greece overcome these economic problems and join the EMU? It all started
when the new government came into office after the elections in fall of 1993, which introduced
a new convergence program for the period 1994-1999 according to the requirements of Article
116 (2a) Treaty on European Community (TEC). Greece committed itself to an ambitious
macroeconomic stabilization policy in order to reduce the inflation rate from 10.8% in 1993 to
3.3% in1999, and restrict the budget deficit from 13.2% of GDP in 1994 to 2.1% of GDP in 1999.80
The first phase of the convergence policy (1994-1999) did not help Greece join the EMU
as it was characterized by an inconsistent and inappropriate policy mix, as the adjustment policy
was based on higher tax revenues and higher interest rates. The government contained its
expansionary income policy and did not cut real consumptive public expenditures, as structural
reforms necessary to improve supply side conditions were postponed.81
As it became evident that Greece would not be allowed to join the EMU with the first
wave of entrants, the government revised its convergence plan in December 1997. The aim of
the new convergence program was to fulfill the convergence criteria by the beginning of 2000 so
that Greece could join the EMU by 2001, one year before euro coins and bills were to replace
the national currencies.
The revised convergence plan brought further improvements in monetary and fiscal
policies. A process of labor market liberalization was initiated, several state enterprises were
privatized, some of them partially, and first steps were made towards cutting the deficit in the
social security system. The measures helped Greece improve the performance of its economy
and Greece joined the EMU in 2001.82
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If the Maastricht Treaty was Supposed to Stabilize The Eurozone, Why Didn’t It
Help Greece?
Some economists claim that Greece was not ready to join the European Monetary
Union and that the only reason it was admitted is that the Greek government cheated the EU
Maastricht deficit rules. Balzli (2010) claims that since 1999, the Maastricht rules threatened
with hefty fines on euro member countries that exceed the budget deficit limit of 3% of gross
domestic product. Total government debt must not exceed 60 % but the Greeks have never
managed to stick to the 60% debt limit, and they only adhered to the 3% deficit ceiling with the
help of blatant balance sheets.
At one time, for example gigantic military expenditures were left out. After recalculating
the figures, the experts at Eurostat consistently came up with the same results: in truth, the
deficit each year has been far greater than the 3% limit. In 2009, it exploded to over 12%.83
Another way the Greek government cheated the Maastricht Treaty was through
fictional exchange rates. Europe's governments obtain funds from investors around the world
by issuing bonds in yen, dollar or Swiss francs. However, they need euros to pay their daily bills.
Years later the bonds are repaid in the original foreign denominations. But in the Greek case, the
US bankers devised a special kind of swap with fictional exchange rates. This enabled Greece to
receive a far higher sum than the actual euro market value of 10 billion dollars or yen. This was
how Goldman Sachs secretly arranged additional credit of up to $1 billion for the Greeks.
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It is important to note that the credit disguised as a swap didn't show up in the Greek
debt statistics. Eurostat's reporting rules don't comprehensively record transactions involving
financial derivatives. "The Maastricht rules can be circumvented quite legally through swaps,"
says a German derivatives dealer.84
In brief, the Maastricht Treaty did not help Greece, because under the
Maastricht convergence criteria, states joining the euro must have their economic houses in
order, and the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact requires ongoing fiscal compliance. Specifically,
states must ensure inflation below 1.5% budget deficits below 3% of GDP, and a debt-to-GDP
ratio of less than 60%. To meet these criteria, many countries had to adopt strict budgetary
reforms. Greece did not adopt these policies enabling it to join the euro.

Construction of Aggregate Debt Profile: Greece
This section provides more detail on the methods used to calculate the debt profile of
Greece. This calculation is important for two main reasons. First, the European Central Bank
(ECB) liquidity provision operations were largest in Greece. The changes in the balance sheet of
the bank of Greece proves this. Second, there were discrepancies between different data
sources, particularly with external debt. The primary source of data on Greek indebtedness was
a set of “financial accounts’ published by the Bank of Greece. These data sets provided in detail
the nature of the stocks of financial assets and liabilities of each sector in the Greek economy.85
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Figure 4.1: Bank of Greece liabilities (euro bn)

Source: Lapavitsas et al (2012) crisis in the Eurozone

Figure 4.2: Bank of Greece assets (euro bn)

Source: Lapavitsas et al (2012) crisis in the Eurozone
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Figure 4.2 shows that both the assets and the liabilities of the Bank of Greece have
increased in recent years. This was confirmed with the balance sheet of the Bank of Greece.
What was found was that liabilities to other euro area monetary financial liabilities accounted
for this increase, while on the asset side corresponding claims were held against domestic
monetary financial institutions. (Crisis in the Eurozone page 149)
From the graphs, we can see that liabilities to other monetary financial institutions
increased sharply during the financial crisis. This increase was as a result of the liquidity
provision. This means that repo operations take place through the home central bank, resulting
in the expansion of both sides of the balance sheet, giving the appearance of increasing
indebtedness at the country level. It is important to note that as these operations were
essentially a domestic liquidity provision by the central bank, they do not constitute an
expression of debt. This is the reason why the external liabilities of the bank of Greece were
excluded from the total debt figures.86
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The Impact of Austerity on Greece since 2010
Austerity measures have had a number of effects on Greece, ranging from economic to
political to social.

(1) Economic Effects:
Figure 4.3. Gross domestic products 2011-2014

Source: OECD
Recession: the continuous drop in GDP in 2011 led to a rapid reduction in domestic
demand, which led to loss of thousands of jobs.
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Figure 4.4: Unemployment Rate

Source: OECD
Unemployment more than doubled within the first three years of austerity, going from
9.616 in 2009 to 24.442 in 2012. As thousands of jobs were lost the new unemployed became
the chronic unemployed.

(2)Social Effects
Spending cuts in Greece have had a devastating social impact, since governments tend
to be both large employers and social nets. Migration of younger and highly educated people
raised brain drain while those studying abroad are reluctant to come back. Homelessness and
suicide rates have also increased.
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Figure 6.4.3. Suicide rates by age group and gender in Greece

Source: Antonakakis and Collins (2014)
Antonakakis and Collins (2014) argue that spending cuts in Greece have caused some
500 male suicides since their implementation. For each 1% decrease in government spending
resulted in a 0.43% rise in suicide rates according to the study. 87

(3) Political effect
Austerity measures can have a number of effects on a country’s politics. Since most
austerity measures target developmental and social spending, social unrest is one of the most
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common after effects of austerity implementation. For example, Greece saw a number of
violent protests to measures undertaken in 2011 and 2012.

Conclusion
Greece was in economic crisis long before it joined the euro. That is why they needed to
manipulate statistics to meet entry into the euro. When the inevitable crisis hit in 2009, Athens
could not make its debt payments. It could no longer borrow at affordable rates, nor could it
devalue its currency to make its product and services more competitive. The main question that
arises now is will Greece stay in the euro? This thesis argues that Greece will stay in the euro for
the following reasons.
1. If Greece leaves the euro and goes back to the drachma, the drachma would lose
value causing inflation. Interest rates will double all mortgages, business loans and other
borrowing will become much more expensive. The lack of credit offered to Greek banks would
mean serious shortages in basic commodities like oil, medicine and food. This will be
catastrophic.
2. The Eurozone will also be affected as the exit of Greece would prove that the euro
was not built to last and investors will quickly begin to assess who would be next to exit. This
would not be good for a growing economy.
3. The Eurozone is backed by a profound political commitment as leaders in political
and business circles have invested substantial political capital and success in the Euro.
The concluding chapter will evaluate the broader question: will the Eurozone survive?
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Chapter 5: The Future of the Euro: Will The Euro Survive The
Eurozone Crisis?
According to Lapavitsas (2010) in order for the euro to survive the Eurozone crisis three
solutions have to be met. The first solution is to adopt austerity measures, the second solution is
to reform the Eurozone and the third solution is to force Greece out of the Eurozone. This thesis
will now explore this three solutions in more detail.
The first alternative is to adopt austerity by cutting wages, reducing public spending,
and raising taxes in the hope of reducing public borrowing requirements. Austerity would have
to be accompanied by bridging loans, or guarantees by core countries to bring down commercial
borrowing rates. It is likely that there would also be ‘structural reform’, including further labor
market flexibility, tougher pension conditions, privatization of remaining public enterprises, and
privatization of education. 88
The aim of such liberalization would presumably be to raise the productivity of labor,
thus improving competitiveness. This is the preferred alternative of ruling elites across
peripheral and core countries, since it shifts the burden of adjustment onto working people. 89
The second alternative is to reform the Eurozone. There is almost universal agreement that
unitary monetary policy and fragmented fiscal policy have been a dysfunctional mix. There is
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also widespread criticism of the ECB for the way it has provided abundant liquidity to banks,
while keeping aloof of borrowing states, even to the extent of ignoring speculative attacks.
A range of reforms that would not challenge the fundamentals of the Maastricht Treaty,
the Stability Pact, and the Lisbon agenda might well be possible. The aim would be to produce
smoother interaction of monetary and fiscal forces, while maintaining the underlying
conservatism of the Eurozone.90
The only problem with this alternative, is that very little in such reforms that would be
attractive to working people or that would indeed deal with the structural imbalances within the
Eurozone. Hence, there have been calls for more radical reforms, including abolition of the
Stability Pact and altering the statutes of the ECB to allow it regularly to lend to member states.
The aim of such reform would be to retain monetary union while creating a ‘good euro’ that
would be beneficial to working people. The ‘good euro’ strategy would involve significantly
expanding the European budget to deliver fiscal transfers from rich to poor countries.91
The main reason why the good euro strategy may not work is that the Eurozone lacks a
unitary state and there is no prospect of acquiring one in the future. The current machinery of
the Eurozone is entirely unsuited for this task. The strategy would face a continuous conflict
between, on the one hand, its ambitious pan-European aims and, on the other, the absence of
state mechanisms that could begin to turn these aims into reality.92
The third alternative is to exit from the Eurozone. It is not clear if this will save the euro,
as economist argue that they cannot think of a time when a developed country with an open
economy dropped out of a shared currency and set up its own new currency. That’s one of the
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reasons why there is so much hesitation to do it; no one really knows what will happen.93 There
are two types of exits mentioned by Lapavitsas, a conservative exit and a progressive exit. The
conservative exit would aim at devaluation. Some of the pressure of adjustment would be
passed on to the international sphere, and exports would revive. But there would also be losses
for those servicing debt abroad, including banks. Workers would face wage declines as the price
of tradable goods would rise. Devaluation would probably be accompanied by austerity and
liberalization, compounding the pressure on workers.94
The progressive exit would require a shift of economic and social power toward labor in
peripheral countries. There would be devaluation accompanied by cessation of payments and
restructuring of debt. To prevent collapse of the financial system, there would have to be
widespread nationalization of banking, creating a system of public banks. Controls would also
have to be imposed on the capital account to prevent outflows of capital. To protect output and
employment, finally, it would then be necessary to expand public ownership over key areas of
the economy, including public utilities, transport and energy.95
Eun and Resnick disagree with Lapavitsas and argue that we will find out when the
Eurozone experiences a major asymmetric shock. The global financial crisis IS in an asymmetric
shock today, and so far the euro has managed to survive. A successful response to these shocks
will require wage, price, and fiscal flexibility. A cautionary note is in order: a symmetric shock
can occur even within a country. In the United States, for example, when oil prices jumped in
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the 1970s, oil consuming regions such as New England suffered a severe recession, whereas
Texas, a major oil producing state, experienced a major boom.96
But the U.S. has managed its economy with a common national monetary policy.
Although asymmetric shocks are no doubt more serious internationally, one should be careful
not to exaggerate their significance as an impediment to monetary union. In addition, since the
advent of the EMS in 1979, the EMU member countries have restricted their monetary policies
in order to maintain exchange rate stability in Europe. Considering that intra-euro zone trade
accounts for about 60 % of foreign trade of the Eurozone crisis, benefits from the EMU are likely
to exceed the associated costs.
Furthermore, leaders in political and business circles in Europe have invested substantial
political capital in the success of the euro. So long as Europe can resolve internal frictions and
imbalances, as revealed in the Greek debt crisis, it seems safe to predict that the euro will
survive.97
Before the launch of the euro in 1999, Milton Friedman predicted that the Eurozone
would not survive its first economic crisis. He noted that in a world of floating exchange rates, if
one country faces a shock, it could simply respond by letting the exchange rate change. But with
the arrival of the euro, that option is no longer available. Friedman might be right amid a
deepening banking crisis in Greece and with the election of a left wing party led by Alexis Tsipras
that could make or break the nation’s ties with the euro zone, the idea of a euro break up has
increasingly become a possibility. The main objective of this thesis was to prove to critics like
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Friedman and the others that the euro will survive the Eurozone crisis. I believe the euro will
survive for the following reasons:

1.

The long-term interest of the participating countries are behind it as the euro collapse
will not only affect the poor counties but the well-off ones as well. As George Soros said
“euro zone keeps Germany’s exports cheap and therefore competitive. What’s more, it
keeps other euro nations from defaulting on their debts. And much of those debts are
owed to German financial institutions. So if the ship sinks, all on board, including
Germany, will sink with it.” ( Financial post)

2. The Eurozone is backed by a profound political commitment as leaders in political and
business circles have invested substantial political capital in the success of the euro.
That is why a tentative agreement was reached on July 13, 2015 by a summit of
Eurozone leaders for a bailout program. If this agreement was not reached, Greece
could have faced bankruptcy and a possible exit from the euro.
3. Europe’s economic and monetary union is not only much stronger than many fear, it is
also much better than the system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates that it
replaced, thus the Eurozone is more likely to get larger than it is to get smaller.
4. Even if Grexit were to occur, the euro will still survive.

A number of proposals have been put forward by various parties to deal with the
Eurozone crises, these include both short term and long term proposals. In the short term it has
been suggested that the ECB should make bond purchases to provide a bailout, and in the long
term a fiscal transfer mechanism will be necessary to solve the Eurozone crisis permanently.

66
It is still unknown if the euro will survive the Eurozone crisis in the near future. We will
find out if this conclusion is correct in the near future. This will depend on two factors: first will
Greece accept the new terms of the bailout; and there was an election recently held on
September 20, 2015. Alexis Tsipras was reelected and we do not know what this new
government might do.
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Appendix

Figure 3.1: composition of the Greek government debt

Source: Kouretas Georgios(2010)
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Figure 3.2.: Evolution of the Greek Public Debt

Source: Kouretas Georgios (2010)
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Table I Euro area 1999-2014

Source: European central bank
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Table II GDP, government deficit/surplus and debt in the EU

Source: Eurostat
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Table III GDP, government deficit/surplus and debt in the EU

Source: Eurostat
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Table IV

GDP, government deficit/surplus and debt in the EU
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Table V

GDP, government deficit/surplus and debt in the EU
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Table VI GDP, government deficit/surplus and debt in the EU
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Table VII GDP, government deficit/surplus and debt in the EU

Source: Eurostat
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Table: VIII Annual inflation rates
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Table IX Quarterly Government debt by Member State

Source: Eurostat
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Figure 3.4: external holders of Spanish debt securities (end 2008)

Source: Lapavitsas et al (2012) crisis in the Eurozone
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Figure 3.5 External holders of Portuguese debt securities (end 2008)

Source: Lapavitsas et al (2012) Crisis in the Eurozone
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Figure 3.6: external holders of Greek debt crisis (end 2008)

Source: Lapavitsas et al (2012) crisis in the Eurozone
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Figure 3.10 GDP growth rate by aggregate demand category-Germany (%)

Source: Lapavitsas et al (2012) crisis in the Eurozone
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Figure 3.11 GDP growth rate by aggregate demand category- France (%)

Source: Lapavitsas et al (2012) crisis in the Eurozone
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Figure 3.12 GDP growth by aggregate demand category- Italy (%)

Source: Lapavitsas et al (2012) crisis in the Eurozone
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Figure 3.13: GDP growth by aggregate demand category- Spain (%)

Source: Lapavitsas et al (2012) crisis in the Eurozone
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Figure 3.14: GDP growth rate by aggregate demand category-Portugal (%)

Source: Lapavitsas et al (2012) crisis in the Eurozone
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Figure 3.15: GDP growth rate by aggregate demand category-Greece (%)

Source:

Lapavitsas et al (2012) crisis in the Eurozone
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GLOSSARY
BOG: Bank of Greece
CB: Central Bank
CPI: Consumer Price Index
EC: European Council
ECB: European central bank
ECU: European currency unit
EDSA: European Debt Surveillance Authority
EFSF: European Financial Stability Pact
EMI: European Monetary Institute
EMS: European Monetary System
EMU: Economic and Monetary union of the European Union
ERM: Exchange Rate Mechanism
EU: European Union
EURATOM: European Atomic Energy Community
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
IMF: International Monetary Fund
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IRC: International Reserve Currency
MFI: Monetary Financial institution
OCA: Optimum Currency Area
OECD: Organization for Economic Corporation and Development
TEC: Treaty on Economic Community
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